Bi-Objective Optimization of Kidney Exchanges by Xu, Siyao
University of Kentucky 
UKnowledge 
Theses and Dissertations--Computer Science Computer Science 
2018 
Bi-Objective Optimization of Kidney Exchanges 
Siyao Xu 
University of Kentucky, johnlanny@yahoo.com 
Digital Object Identifier: https://doi.org/10.13023/ETD.2018.090 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Xu, Siyao, "Bi-Objective Optimization of Kidney Exchanges" (2018). Theses and Dissertations--Computer 
Science. 62. 
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/cs_etds/62 
This Master's Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Computer Science at UKnowledge. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations--Computer Science by an authorized administrator of 
UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
STUDENT AGREEMENT: 
I represent that my thesis or dissertation and abstract are my original work. Proper attribution 
has been given to all outside sources. I understand that I am solely responsible for obtaining 
any needed copyright permissions. I have obtained needed written permission statement(s) 
from the owner(s) of each third-party copyrighted matter to be included in my work, allowing 
electronic distribution (if such use is not permitted by the fair use doctrine) which will be 
submitted to UKnowledge as Additional File. 
I hereby grant to The University of Kentucky and its agents the irrevocable, non-exclusive, and 
royalty-free license to archive and make accessible my work in whole or in part in all forms of 
media, now or hereafter known. I agree that the document mentioned above may be made 
available immediately for worldwide access unless an embargo applies. 
I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use in 
future works (such as articles or books) all or part of my work. I understand that I am free to 
register the copyright to my work. 
REVIEW, APPROVAL AND ACCEPTANCE 
The document mentioned above has been reviewed and accepted by the student’s advisor, on 
behalf of the advisory committee, and by the Director of Graduate Studies (DGS), on behalf of 
the program; we verify that this is the final, approved version of the student’s thesis including all 
changes required by the advisory committee. The undersigned agree to abide by the statements 
above. 
Siyao Xu, Student 
Dr. Judy Goldsmith, Major Professor 
Dr. Mirek Truszczynski, Director of Graduate Studies 
Bi-Objective Optimization of Kidney Exchanges
THESIS
A thesis submitted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Science in
the College of Engineering at the
University of Kentucky
By
Siyao Xu
Lexington, Kentucky
Director: Dr. Judy Goldsmith, Professor of Computer Science
Lexington, Kentucky 2018
Copyright c© Siyao Xu 2018
ABSTRACT OF THESIS
Bi-Objective Optimization of Kidney Exchanges
Matching people to their preferences is an algorithmic topic with real world appli-
cations. One such application is the kidney exchange. The best “cure” for patients
whose kidneys are failing is to replace it with a healthy one. Unfortunately, biologi-
cal factors (e.g., blood type) constrain the number of possible replacements. Kidney
exchanges seek to alleviate some of this pressure by allowing donors to give their
kidney to a patient besides the one they most care about and in turn the donor for
that patient gives her kidney to the patient that this first donor most cares about.
Roth et al. first discussed the classic kidney exchange problem. Freedman et al. ex-
panded upon this work by optimizing an additional objective in addition to maximal
matching. In this work, I implement the traditional kidney exchange algorithm as
well as expand upon more recent work by considering multi-objective optimization
of the exchange. In addition I compare the use of 2-cycles to 3-cycles. I offer two
hypotheses regarding the results of my implementation. I end with a summary and
a discussion about potential future work.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Matching people according to their preferences is a well studied algorithmic problem.
Classic problems in the field include stable marriage and housing preferences. In both
of those cases, we are attempting to maximize the utility of each person. In the case
of kidney exchanges, lives (not just utility) are literally on the line [22, 19].
From an algorithmic perspective, kidney exchanges present an interesting match-
ing problem for at least three reasons. The first issue is the online nature of kidney
exchanges. This simply means that when an organ becomes available is highly ran-
dom and unknown. Kidneys outside the body can only last a maximum of 30 hours.
In some instances, donors are flown to the hospital, which alleviates some of the
problem.
The second issue is the simultaneity involved in the surgeries. In order to pre-
vent reneging, all the people involved in the swap simultaneously undergo surgery.
This means that assuming n pairs of people, there will be 2n operations.In both the
academic literature and our work, cycles are usually capped at some small integer L,
usually 2 or 3. One reason for capping the cycle is so that if a pair wanted the back
out at the last minute fewer agents are affected [9, 2].
Finally, there is the issue of social welfare. For example it is generally considered
not wise from a societal standpoint to give old kidneys to young people and young
kidneys to old people [22]. Among other reasons, if the old kidney that is transplanted
to a young person suddenly fails, the next kidney will be harder to graft in from a
biological standpoint.
Alvin Roth first described the classic kidney exchange problem. He introduced
the top trading cycle and chain mechanism [18]. Essentially, he added a “wait option”
and allowed for the formation of chains in addition to the use of cycles to find maximal
matchings. The use of cycles alone was established earlier by Gale and Shapley [10].
Dickerson, Conitzer et al. expanded on this work to optimize a second objective once
the maximal matching has been determined [9]. In this work, I optimize over multiple
objectives once the maximal matching has been determined. In both Freedman’s work
and mine, we use only cycles to compute maximal matchings.
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 discusses the importance
of kidneys and the classic kidney exchange problem. Both the direct exchange as well
as the indirect kidney exchange will be discussed. This is followed by pseudo-code as
well as a discussion of some results of the experiment. Chapter 3 focuses on bi-criteria
optimization, what it is and how it relates to the classic kidney exchange problem.
The two criteria under consideration are age and Euclidean distance. Chapter 4
discusses the implementation and results of the experiment. Chapter 5 summarizes
and discusses potential avenues for future work.
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Chapter 2 The Classical Kidney Exchange Problem
In this chapter, we note the biological importance of kidneys and then discuss the
direct kidney exchange and the indirect kidney exchange. These concepts are com-
bined algorithmically to form the “top trading cycle and chain.” Implementation of
TTCC and its results are briefly discussed.
I Biological Importance of Kidneys and Other Facts
Kidneys are vital to the human body as they are responsible for filtering out the
toxins and waste of the body. Out of the over 121,000 people in the United States
waiting for an organ, over 100,000 of them are waiting for a kidney [7]. Every person
starts life with two kidneys but only needs one to live.
Due to various biological complications (such as blood types), people are not
always eligible to give a kidney to the person to whom they most want to give [5, 16, 8].
Recent advances in medicine however allow this potential donor to give to another
waiting patient while that patient’s potential donor donates her kidney to this original
donor’s patient. Such a swap is called a kidney exchange. Kidney exchanges come in
two basic types known as direct exchange and indirect exchange.
II Direct Kidney Exchange Algorithm
The direct kidney exchange is similar to the housing allocation problem. In the
housing allocation problem there is a set of people, each of whom owns a house. Each
person has a set of strict preferences for every house [14, 10]. Consider the following
example:
Example:
Person 1 [1,2,3]
Person 2 [3,1,2]
Person 3 [1,3,2]
In the above illustration, person 1 prefers house 1 (e.g., his own house) the
most and then houses of person 2 and 3. Person 2 prefers the house of person
3 and then the house of person 1 and finally her own house. Person 3 prefers
the house of person 1, then his own house, then the house of person 2.
We say that matchings are Pareto optimal if no person can get a better house
without another person getting a worse house. We say that matchings are stable in
this context to mean that even if a person had an incentive to exchange for a better
house, no other person would be available to exchange with her [20].
To find the optimal stable matching of person to house, Shapley introduced the
top trading cycle algorithm. The top trading cycle proceeds in rounds. In each round
the (remaining) people point to their most preferred (remaining) house. A person
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can point to their own house (e.g., self cycles are allowed.) Claim: In each round of
pointing, there must exist a cycle.
Proof. Let there be n nodes. Each node must have an edge pointing to another node
or to itself. In the case of a node pointing to itself the existence of a cycle is trivial
as it is a self cycle. In the case of all nodes pointing to a different node, every node
has an out-degree of one. As you traverse through the graph going through the finite
set of nodes, eventually you must revisit an node and thus a cycle is formed.
Execute the trade of such a cycle or in the case of a self cycle, let that person
remain in her current house. Remove the nodes in that cycle from consideration.
Repeat this until every person is matched to a house. When this algorithm terminates
there will be a Pareto optimal as well as stable set of matchings [12]. This algorithm
has the property that the dominant strategy is being truthful in your preference
ordering [12].
III Indirect Kidney Exchange Algorithm
In addition to direct kidney exchanges we can also envision a wait list available to
people who currently do not have an available donor. Donors that have a patient that
they care about but cannot donate to, can give their kidneys to any patient on the
waiting list and in exchange their preferred patient will be placed in a more favorable
spot on the the waiting list. This concept of indirect exchange was introduced by
Roth in the context of student housing. The mechanism is called, “I get your house,
you get my turn” [18, 1]. The algorithm is described as follows.
Let there be four entities: new students, existing students, occupied houses, vacant
houses. Let there be a strict ordering of housing preferences for each student. There
is now a line of students each of whom has a set of housing preferences. Assign
each new student his top choice and the second new student her top choice among
remaining houses. As this line of student preferences proceeds there may be a new
student who requests the house of an existing student. Before allocating the new
student the house that currently has an existing student, move that current student
to the top of the student preference line. Ask her what her current top housing
preference is. One of three things can happen. She can prefer her current house, in
which case, the new student must choose his next preferred house. She can prefer a
vacant house, which will be assigned to her and her current house is then assigned to
the new student. She can prefer the house of another existing student, in which case
that student is now brought to the front of the student preferences line with the same
three options available to him. As these assignments proceed, if a cycle develops, it
will be between existing tenants. Each existing tenant will request the room of the
tenant next in this cycle. Remove that cycle by executing the trade. This process of
matching houses to students incentives existing students who already have a house to
join the market because they are guaranteed to be at least as well off as not joining
the student housing market and can possibly improve [18].
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Consider the following illustration. Let there be three new students, 1 and 2 and
3. Let there be three existing students (4,5,6) that already live in houses 4, 5 and 6
respectively. Let there be three vacant houses labeled 1, 2 and 3. Let the following
be the housing preferences of each student.
Example:
New Student 1 [4,1,2,6,5,3]
New Student 2 [2,3,5,6,1,4]
New Student 3 [1,2,3,4,5,6]
Current Student 4 [4,5,3,6,2,1]
Current Student 5 [6,5,1,3,4,2]
Current Student 6 [5,3,2,4,1,6]
According to our algorithm, new student 1, who is currently at the top of the
student preferences line wants house 4. House 4, however is occupied by current
student 4. The algorithm now moves her to the head of the line and considers her
preferences. She likes her current house, and thus student 4 remains with house 4 and
student 1 now points to his next most preferred house. Student 1 prefers house 1 and
since that is a vacant house, gets it. Student 2 points to a vacant house as well and
gets paired with it. Student 3 prefers house 1 the most, but that house was already
assigned to student 1 and similarly for house 2, therefore student 3 is stuck with her
third choice which is vacant house 3. Student 4 has already been taken care of by
virtue of jumping the line thanks to student 1. Current student 5 prefers house 6
which is currently occupied. Current student 6 prefers house 5 and thus they engage
in a mutually beneficial swap. The final student:house pairings are [1:1, 2:2, 3:3, 4:4,
5:6, 6:5].
IV Top Trading Cycle and Chains: A Combination of the Direct and
Indirect Exchanges
We are now ready to combine both direct and indirect exchanges to solve the classical
kidney exchange problem.
First note that based on the indirect exchange algorithm above, a natural analogy
appears. The cadaveric kidneys are vacant houses, the people with no donors are the
new students, the people with a loved one as a donor are the current students, and
the people who are available to exchange kidneys are the occupied houses.
In this setup each person has a list of preferences including a new option called
wait. Note that because there is now a wait option, there need not be a strict ordering
of preferences over all available options [18].
Like the top trading cycle each (remaining) person points to their favorite (re-
maining) kidney in each round.
At this point one of two things can happen. A cycle can form, in which case a
trade should be executed among the members of the cycle. Both the patients and
kidneys should then be removed from future consideration. The other possibility is
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that a wait chain will be created. The patients in this wait chain1 are pointing to
their most preferred kidney. The wait chain ends with a patient who points to the
wait option. This patient is called the head of the chain. All of the patients and their
kidneys on the wait chain will be removed from future consideration as well. As soon
as a kidney exogenously appears (e.g., an altruistic or cadaver donor) and satisfies
the person at the head of the chain, then the rest of the people in that w-chain will
get their kidney [18].
Consider the following illustration. Let there be four donor-patients pairs such
that pair 1 is donor 1 and patient 1 and so on. There are no self cycles so only
exchange cycles and wait chains can occur. Let the following be an example of the
preferred kidneys of each donor by each patient.
Example:
Patient 1 [4,2,w]
Patient 2 [3,1,4]
Patient 3 [2,w]
Patient 4 [3,1,2]
In the first round patient 1 prefers the kidney of donor 4; patient 2 prefers the
kidney of donor 3; patient 3 prefers the kidney of donor 2; and patient 4 prefers the
kidney of donor 3. The cycle that is formed is between pairs 2 and 3.
In the second round patient 1 prefers to wait while patient 4 prefers the kidney
of donor 1. Here we have a wait chain of 4 → 1 → w. As soon as patient 1 gets a
kidney exogenously (e.g., from a cadaver), person 4 will get a kidney from donor 1.
V Top Trading Cycle and Chain Pseudo Code
Algorithm 1 Top Trading Cycle and Chain
Initialize a random preference list for each person in the set
while Not every patient has a kidney do
Let each undeclared person point to favorite kidney or ’w’
Search through this graph to find the cycle or the wait chain
Execute the trade in this cycle, or remove all people in the wait list chain
Remove all such people and kidneys from the graph
Continue the next round
End once everyone either has a kidney or is part of some wait chain
end while
VI Experimental Setup and Results
The classic kidney exchange algorithm was implemented with two distinct compo-
nents. The data generation was implemented in Python using the permutation func-
tion to generate random preference lists. Once the preference arrays were generated,
1“Waitlist”, “Wait Chain” and w-chain are all interchangeable terms for the same thing.
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Figure 2.1: The number and length of cycles
they were run through the TTCC program to find the matchings of patient to kidney.
The experiment started off with 10 people and was incremented by 1 all the way up
to 25 people. For each size of people, 5 trials were run and averaged.
The experiments analyzed the number of cycles and number of chains as well as
the average number of people per cycle and average number of people per chain. Also
the average preference of a kidney that the patient received was analyzed.
CPU time was run separately as it required a large number of people to see any
effect. Running the experiment with just 25 people or fewer would often lead to 0
CPU seconds used. Therefore I also ran the experiment with 50, 100, 1000, 2000,
3000, 4000, and 5000 patients twice for each number of patients, and averaged the
CPU time.
VII Discussion of the Top Trading Cycle and Chains Graphs
As the number of people increased, the number of cycles increased but the average
length of each cycle stayed relatively steady. The opposite phenomenon occurred
with chains. The number of chains averaged close to 1. There were a few times in the
experiments when there was no chain and everyone was part of the kidney exchange
cycle thus depressing the average a little bit.
The length of the chain had an upward trend as the number of people increased.
The increase in the number of people also increased the number of rounds needed
to terminate the algorithm. In turn, the increase in the number of rounds needed,
seemed to decrease the average preference of the kidney received by the patient (i.e.,
the utility went down). As the number of people increased, the CPU time increased
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Figure 2.2: The number and length of chains
Figure 2.3: The average preference of the kidney received
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Figure 2.4: The average number of rounds needed before the algorithm terminated
Figure 2.5: The CPU Runtime
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in a quadratic manner. This is to be expected because the top trading cycle and
chain algorithm is an O(n2) time algorithm [12].
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Chapter 3 Bi-Objective Optimization of Kidney Exchanges
I Bi-objective Optimization
In the real world, we often care about more than just the optimization of one objective.
For example a stock broker wants to maximize returns while minimizing risk and the
driver wants to maximize scenic beauty while minimizing drive time [6]. Often these
objectives are in conflict with one another and we are not sure what the relative
weights of each objective are [21, 4, 13]. Indeed, if we were sure of the importance
placed on each objective, we could transform the problem back into a single objective
optimization problem [6].
In the multi-objective optimization case there is no single best solution [4]. Instead
we are trying to find the “most preferred” outcome. “Most preferred” gives rise to
the idea of non-dominated point. This is the point that cannot be improved upon
in one objective without sacrificing in the other. A non-dominated point is called
an efficient point and the Pareto set is composed of these efficient points. Note that
there can be non-dominated points that are not in the Pareto set [4].
In the case of kidney exchanges we have the following objectives:
• Maximize the number of matchings in the kidney pair pool. This is the main
objective.
• Minimize the total of pairwise age differences of the matchings. As an example,
consider a 2-cycle in which pair one had a donor-age of 50 and a patient-age of
42. The second pair has a donor-age of 61 and a patient-age of 33. The total
age difference would be (50− 33) + (61− 42) = 36.1
• Minimize the total geographic distance between the donating pairs. As an
example, consider a 3-cycle in which the first donor-patient pair with a location
of (20,40), the second donor-patient pair has a location of (43, 34), and the
third has a location of (27, 72). The total distance would be the Euclidean
distance of pairs 1 and 2 (23.7) plus Euclidean distance of pairs 2 and 3 (41.2)
plus Euclidean distance of pairs 1 and 3 (32.7) for a total distance of 97.6.
In accordance with the literature [9] we make each edge used in a matching have
a weight of one and the utility function is simply the summation of all the edges
multiplied by a large number n. In our case the n was chosen to be 500. By multiply-
ing this objective by such a large number, we are ensuring that this objective takes
precedence over the two minimization objectives.
1Note that technically we are using the absolute value of the differences. To see why, consider a
2-cycle in which the first pair has a donor of age 40 and a patient of age 50. The other pair has has
a donor of age 50 and a patient of age 40. To strictly use differences, we would have one difference
of (40− 50) = −10 and another difference of 50− 40 = 10. This would imply the summation of the
exchange has a total age difference of 0, which is incorrect, it should be 20.
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We then penalize the utility of the maximal match by subtracting it from the sum
of the total age difference times weight1 (e.g., α ·
∑
age differences) as well as the
sum of the total distance times weight2 (e.g., β ·
∑
distance). The weights have an
additional constraint: (α+β) = 1. The two weights are used to show the importance
we place on each of the two minimization objectives once the maximal matching has
occurred.
• U= (500·
∑
maxmatch ) - (α ·
∑
age differences ) - (β ·
∑
distance)
• α + β = 1
II Experimental Setup
The experiment was implemented using Notepad++ and run via Windows PowerShell
using Anaconda and Python 3.6.2. The main library used was GurobiPy and the
starter code for finding the maximal matches came from the Gurobi kidney exchange
example online [11].
First random kidney pairs were generated that contained blood type, location,
and age. The blood type percentages were given by LiveScience [5], while the ages
were uniformly randomized between 30 and 70. [17]. This corresponds to the 2017
US census breakdown of the age groups.2 The ages were randomized by the following
equation:
Agenormalized =
Ageactual − 30
40
.
Finally the y-axis coordinates were randomized between 24 and 49 while the x-axis
coordinates were randomized between 66 and 124.3 These numbers came from the
most extreme points of the continental United States as noted by the World Almanac
[3].
Once the kidney pairs were generated, we created three matrices. The first matrix
is used to check whether a donor from one pair can donate kidneys to a patient from
another pair and vice versa. This is done by creating directional edges in the graph.
The second matrix keeps track of the age differential between the donor of one
pair and the patient of another. The third matrix keeps track of the distance between
any two pairs. The distance was calculated by calling the numpy Euclidean distance
function. The distance was then normalized by copying the distance matrix into
another matrix called normalized distance. Using numpy, I got the maximum distance
and the minimum distance for the instance. Then to normalize, I use the following
equation:
Distancenormalized =
Distanceactual −Distancemin
Distancemax −Distancemin
.
The results display total utility as a function of the two weights.
2Age 30–39: 13 percent; 40–49: 13 percent; 50–59: 13 percent; 60–69: 11 percent
3The northernmost point is Northwest Angle, MN at 49◦ N. The southernmost point is Key
West, FL at 24◦ N. The westernmost point is Bodelteh Islands, WA at 124◦ W. The easternmost
point is West Quoddy Head, ME at 66◦ W.
11
III First Set of Experimental Results
The experiment consisted of 100 kidney pairs. Multiple instances of the experiment
were run with the same pattern recurring. The x-axis represents the relative weighting
of the two minimization objectives while the y-axis represents the total utility.
As the weighting increases in favor of distance and decreases in age, the total
utility is decreasing fairly steadily and looks linear. The following is my hypotheses
as to why this might be the case.
Hypothesis: The expected value of minimization of age is bigger than the
expected value of minimization of distance.
Let us consider the 2-cycle case. The expected value of age is 1
40
·0+ 1
40
·1+... 1
40
·40
for an expected value of 20.5.
Finding the expected value of distance was tricker but recall that we transformed
the continental United States into a rectangle with width of 58 and height of 25
and diagonal of approximately 63. The formula for finding the expected value
of a rectangle [15] is:
1
15
(
w3
h2
+ h
3
w2
+ d
(
3− w2
h2
− h2
w2
)
+ 5
2
((
h2
w
) (
logw+d
h
)
+
(
w2
h
) (
log h+d
w
)))
.
After plugging in the numbers, we have an expected value for distance of 15.6.
This number is smaller than the expected value of age which is 20.5.
IV Second Set of Experimental Results
I also looked at the number and percentages of 2-cycles used versus 3-cycles. As I
ran many more instances of Pareto front generation I found that the program favored
usage of 2-cycles, without exception and often dramatically. I also found that after a
few iterations, without fail, the number of total cycles used, 2-cycles used and 3-cycles
did not change.
Dominant use of 2-cycles is further evidenced by the fact that as the iterations
are being computed, the weights being placed on each objective are slowly shifting
by small increments, yet the overwhelming usage of 2-cycles remains constant.
Hypothesis: The (sometimes overwhelming) preference for 2-cycles is a
consequence of the utility function.
Recall that in our utility function, there is penalty for the distance and the age.
In a 3-cycle, you must add an additional age and an additional distance versus a
2-cycle. This extra penalty is enough to make the preference for 2-cycles fairly
strong.
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(a) Pareto Front 1
(b) Pareto Front 2
Figure 3.1: Two Instances of the Bi-Objective Kidney Exchange
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(a) Second Question 1
(b) Second Question 2
Figure 3.2: One set of 2-Cycle versus 3-Cycle Graphs
14
(a) Second Example 1
(b) Second Example 2
Figure 3.3: Second set of 2-Cycle versus 3-Cycle Graphs
15
Chapter 4 Summary and Future Work
Matching people to preferences has real world applications, none more so than kidney
exchanges. I have reviewed classical kidney exchange problem with results from my
implementations. I then looked at the kidney exchange problem as a bi-objective
optimization problem. The two objectives were minimization of age and distance,
once the maximal matching occurred. Both of these objectives arose from real world
concerns related to kidney exchange. By using 2- and 3-cycle kidney matchings and
transforming the dual objective problem into a sequence of single objective maxi-
mization problems I then generated elements of the Pareto front. I hypothesized that
the greater expected value of minimizing age explains the phenomena and was right.
I also showed that 2-cycles are much more preferred than 3-cycles and I hypoth-
esize that this is due to the utility function used.
While the results of the work show promise in multi-objective optimization of the
kidney exchange problem, it is just a first step.
The next steps could include trying to scale up the optimiztion as well as trying to
generate ε-covers that uniformly approximate the Pareto front rather than sampling
it. There are also a couple outstanding questions still to be resolved.
1. Must the normalized Pareto be decreasing linearly or was that a consequence
of how we set up the problem?
2. After a few iterations, the number of 2-cycles used settled on a number and
percentage and never deviated afterwards. What explains this phenomenon?
If this thesis whets interest in the topic of kidney exchanges with multi-criteria
optimization, it will have served its purpose.
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